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ABSTRACT 
Research regarding the evaluation of alibis has been sparse to date. The current experiments 
were designed to assess how people evaluate and process alibi statements. It was 
hypothesized that people approach alibis with skepticism and that alibis elicit different 
processing from evaluators than do everyday memory statements. Experiment 1 used a 
cognitive busyness paradigm to assess the starting point from which alibi evaluators begin. 
Results indicated the cognitive busyness manipulation did not affect participants' ratings of 
believability of either the weak or strong alibi. The superficial evaluation hypothesis was 
advanced as a potential explanation for the ineffectiveness of the busyness manipulation— 
that participants who were cognitively busy were interrupted in their processing of the central 
facts of the case but were nonetheless able to use simple, peripheral cues to arrive at similar 
evaluations as non-cognitively-busy participants. Experiment 2 manipulated the timing and 
type of alibi schema to examine whether alibis are processed differently from a normal 
narrative story. All participants viewed the same narrative account; some participants knew 
prior to viewing that the account was an alibi whereas others discovered after viewing that 
the account was an alibi. In addition, some participants were told the guilt or innocence status 
of the alibi provider. Results indicated that when participants did not know the ultimate status 
of the alibi provider and knew that they were viewing an alibi prior to watching the alibi 
video, their recall was biased toward details occurring during the time period most relevant to 
the alibi. Knowledge that the account was an alibi affected participants' encoding, but not 
retrieval, of the alibi story. There was no clear support for the hypothesis that alibi evaluators 
approach alibis with skepticism, but there was support for the hypothesis that people encode 
alibi information differently than they encode an everyday narrative account. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2003, Steven Avery walked out of prison. Seventeen years after he 
was convicted of sexual assault and attempted murder, Avery was the 137th American man 
exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing (The Innocence Project, n.d.). Avery's case 
highlights the difficulty of presenting an alibi defense that evaluators would find compelling: 
He presented 16 alibi corroborators who, together, established his whereabouts for the entire 
day. Some of these corroborators were family and friends; others were strangers—store 
clerks who presented receipts and testimony that they remembered him because they thought 
it was unusual that he was shopping with his wife and five children, including 6-day-old 
twins. An alibi is theoretically enough to keep an innocent person out of trouble: off the 
suspect list, out of the courtroom, out of prison. So why was such a compelling alibi not 
enough to keep Avery out of prison? 
How does a person go about evaluating an alibi, weighing its believability, and 
deciding whether the alibi provider is truthful or not? Does the alibi evaluation process differ 
from other types of evaluation processes? Some initial evidence suggests an alibi skepticism 
hypothesis—that evaluators are particularly skeptical with regard to alibis. In a study 
designed to test a classification system for scoring alibis, Olson and Wells (2004a) presented 
alibis with varying types of corroboration to participants and asked them to rate how 
believable they found the alibis. The alibis factorially combined physical evidence 
corroboration and person evidence corroboration. The physical evidence included no 
evidence, easily fabricated evidence in the form of a cash receipt, and difficult to fabricate 
evidence in the form of a security camera video. The person evidence included no 
corroboration, a motivated familiar other corroborator in the form of a close relative or 
2 
friend, a non-motivated familiar other in the form of a regular waitress or store clerk, and a 
non-motivated stranger, who had no previous relationship with the alibi provider, in the form 
of a taxi driver or store clerk. Olson and Wells found that participants rated the alibis that 
combined no person and no physical evidence as least believable (mean 4.8 on a 0-10 scale) 
and alibis that combined a non-motivated familiar other and difficult-to-fabricate physical 
evidence as the most believable (mean 7.4 on a 0-10 scale). Olson and Wells note that even 
the most compelling alibis, with videotape corroboration, were still not regarded as wholly 
believable by their participants. 
What kind of evidence might be needed for an alibi to earn a score of 10? The study 
by Olson and Wells has its limitations—they asked participants to take the role of a detective 
on a case, and this role-playing may have given participants a more skeptical mindset. The 
alibis used were written descriptions of the alibis given by the suspects in the case—perhaps 
a richer context, in which participants see the alibi provider on video, might reduce the 
skepticism exhibited by participants in the Olson and Wells study. Nevertheless, the Olson 
and Wells study provides some initial empirical evidence of alibi evaluators' skepticism. 
The post-conviction DNA exoneration cases also provide some anecdotal evidence 
that suggests support for the alibi skepticism hypothesis. Steven Avery's case is unusual in 
its number and variation of alibi corroborators; however, it is important to remember that in 
all the DNA exoneration cases, the innocent men had alibis that were likely true but were 
nonetheless ineffective. Forty DNA exoneration cases highlighted in a position paper of the 
American Psychology-Law Society (Wells et al., 1998) occasionally included a weak alibi or 
no alibi as incriminating evidence. However, the convictions in these cases were likely not 
due only to evaluators' skepticism about alibis but were likely the result of a number of 
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contributing factors. For instance, the DNA exoneration cases show a high rate of mistaken 
eyewitness identifications. A confident eyewitness identification, even a mistaken one, is a 
powerful piece of incriminatory evidence (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, 
& Ferguson, 1979). Hence, the convictions in these DNA exoneration cases might simply 
reflect the persuasive power of the incriminating (albeit incorrect) evidence rather than 
reflect the weak persuasive power of the alibis. 
Thus far, the evidence that people approach the evaluation of alibis with skepticism is 
slim, but findings in other areas of social psychology support the idea that alibis might arouse 
skepticism. For instance, from the persuasion and social influence literature, the credibility of 
a speaker varies according to his or her expertise and trustworthiness (Hovland, Janis, & 
Kelley, 1953). An evaluator is not likely to question an alibi provider's expertise—it is 
reasonable to expect that a person know where he or she was at a given time. However, an 
alibi provider's trustworthiness is central to an evaluation of an alibi. A speaker is perceived 
as more credible and trustworthy when he or she attempts to persuade on a topic that is seen 
as something not in the speaker's self-interest (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Walster, 
Aronson, & Abrahams, 1966). Alibi providers, by the very nature of the task they must 
perform, are speaking in their own self-interest, trying to keep out of trouble. Thus, the alibi 
provider (and by extension the story) may be seen as considerably less credible than if he or 
she had told a story that was not an alibi. 
Attribution theory gives us a related clue as to why evaluators might approach alibis 
with skepticism. Kelley (1973) hypothesized that a given explanation for a behavior is given 
less weight (discounted) if additional explanations are present or can be imagined. Wells and 
Ronis (1982) found that the number of additional explanations for a behavior are less 
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important to an evaluator's attribution than the total strength of the additional explanations. 
Discounting of a given explanation also tends to be greatest when the explanations are 
mutually exclusive (McClure, 1998). In the alibi situation, one possible explanation is that 
the alibi provider is giving a factual account of his or her whereabouts. However, a salient, 
and mutually exclusive, alternative explanation is the "alibi provider is lying" explanation— 
that the alibi provider is concealing his or her role in the crime and is trying to "get away 
with it." Perhaps the "alibi provider is lying" explanation is strong enough that the evaluator 
discounts the believability ascribed to even a true alibi. 
Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, and Beattie (1981) identified the innuendo effect— 
another reason to expect that evaluators would regard alibis with suspicion. Innuendo is a 
potentially damaging statement about a person and a qualifier which denies the truth of the 
original statement. In Wegner and colleagues' research, an innuendo often took the form of a 
newspaper headline in the form of a question or a denial, such as "Andrew Winters Not 
Involved in Bank Embezzlement." One would expect that the original, damaging statement 
would not affect judgments of the target person—the qualifier should negate the original 
statement. However, Wegner and colleagues found that the original statement retains a 
considerable influence on evaluators in spite of the qualifier. The original statement is 
generally more salient to the evaluator, and thus better remembered, than the qualifier. 
Wegner and colleagues state that they would expect to find innuendo effects occurring in 
situations similar to the context of their study: a highly charged atmosphere of evaluation and 
a lack of prior audience knowledge of the target, which sounds quite similar to the alibi 
situation. 
5 
The social understanding framework (see Ybarra, Schaberg, & Keiper, 1999) outlines 
how evaluators' expectancies about a target person can shape perceptions and judgments of 
that person. Social norms tend to encourage positive behavior, and targets who exhibit 
positive behavior can be perceived as conforming to social pressures—their behavior is 
attributable to the situation. Negative behavior, on the other hand, breaks powerful situational 
social norms; thus, evaluators perceive negative behavior as more indicative of the target's 
disposition. Rothbart and Park (1986) showed that very little negative information is needed 
for an evaluator to infer that a target is unfavorable. Perhaps the mere knowledge that a 
person is providing an alibi is enough negative information to arouse unfavorable 
impressions of the alibi provider and thoughts of suspicion. 
Evaluators may also operate under the assumption that a truthful alibi ought to have a 
greater level of proof than the average person can provide. Olson and Wells (2004b) gave 
participants an alibi with a moderate level of corroborating evidence (the suspect claimed to 
be watching a football game with his friend, who corroborated the story). Half the 
participants were asked to generate an alibi of their own prior to evaluating the alibi, the 
other half were asked to evaluate the alibi and then generate an alibi of their own. The 
participants who were asked to generate their own alibi first rated the suspect's alibi as more 
believable than those who were asked to evaluate the suspect's alibi first. Perhaps those who 
generated their own alibi first discovered how difficult it was to come up with an alibi story 
and thus gave the suspect the benefit of the doubt when evaluating his alibi. 
Although there are theoretical reasons to think that alibi evaluators are highly 
skeptical, there are no data directly addressing this alibi skepticism hypothesis. Furthermore, 
the psychological processes that might characterize this skepticism have not been studied. 
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The following studies attempted to address both of these questions by using methods that 
assess the "starting point" that alibi evaluators use and that assess how alibi information is 
encoded and retrieved from memory. Experiment 1 used cognitive busyness procedures and 
belief measures to examine the starting point from which alibi evaluators begin processing. 
Where might skepticism enter the process—does the evaluator begin a skeptic or does 
disbelief enter later in the process? Experiment 2 used memory measures to examine the 
cognitive processes of alibi evaluators. Do evaluators tend to organize the storyline of an 
alibi in a different fashion than they would organize an average autobiographical account? Is 
this organization reflected in the evaluators' encoding of the story, retrieval of the story, or 
both? 
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EXPERIMENT 1 : USING COGNITIVE BUSYNESS TO INFER 
ALIBI EVALUATORS' STARTING POINT 
One useful way to think about the initiation of the alibi evaluation process comes 
from the judgment and decision-making literature—the starting point can be thought of as an 
anchor from which evaluators must adjust to reach their final decisions. Anchoring and 
adjustment is a well-known heuristic first described by Tver sky and Kahneman (1974). A 
decision maker uses an initial value as an anchor and adjusts his or her estimate away from 
that anchor, using other information he or she may have. However, if the decision maker fails 
to adequately adjust from the initial anchor, biased judgment may result. Gilbert (2002) 
argued that "anchoring and adjustment describes the process by which the human mind does 
virtually all its inferential work" (p. 167). 
Alibi evaluators have several possible anchors or starting points when they first begin 
evaluating an alibi. They could begin with an assumption of truth; their starting point would 
be belief in the alibi. They could begin with an assumption of neutrality, neither inclined to 
believe the alibi provider's story nor disbelieve it. Lastly, they could begin with an 
assumption of deception, assuming that the alibi provider is actually guilty of the crime and 
is lying when telling his or her story; their starting point would be skepticism of the alibi. I 
will address theoretical and empirical support for why one might expect each of these starting 
points. 
One possible starting point for alibi evaluators is the assumption of truth, assuming 
that the alibi provider is telling the truth and the alibi is accurate. The assumption of truth is 
fundamental to everyday discourse. According to Grice (1975), conversation is a cooperative 
effort governed by several principles and sub-principles. One of these maxims is quality— 
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participants in a conversation should not say things that they believe to be false or for which 
they lack sufficient evidence. Grice (1975) pointed out that the maxim of quality holds even 
in interactions that are not conversational in nature—when making a cake and the recipe calls 
for sugar, I do not expect my sister to hand me salt. O'Sullivan noted that people generally 
tend to exhibit an assumption of truth and judge others as truthful most of the time (2003; see 
also O'Sullivan, Eckman, & Friesen, 1988). Gilbert (1991) argued that a default assumption 
of truth is adaptive, that we must believe our senses and other people in order to survive— 
when someone yells, "Watch out for that tree!" I do not have time to entertain the possibility 
the warning is false; I must react immediately. 
The philosopher Baruch Spinoza argued that a default assumption of truth is a 
fundamental component of the way the human mind understands and believes ideas. He 
proposed that in the instant the mind comprehends an idea, it must implicitly believe the idea 
to be true, that comprehension and belief are one and the same process (Spinoza, 1677/2000). 
However, people are not destined to believe every idea they have ever had; Spinoza thought 
that people could undergo a second processing step and evaluate an idea by comparing it 
with existing knowledge. If the existing knowledge contradicts the new idea, the new idea is 
thrown into doubt and it may be tagged false. A key element of a Spinozan system is that if a 
person is prevented from comparing a new bit of false information with existing knowledge 
(i.e., prevented from thinking about the false information), then the person should act as if 
the false information is true. The Spinozan position thus predicts that alibi evaluators should 
begin with an assumption of truth. 
Spinoza's conception of the psychology of belief and the starting point that people 
operate from contradicts the conception of belief put forward by his contemporary René 
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Descartes, whose philosophy was influenced by his strong commitment to the idea of free 
will. Descartes stated that comprehension and perception are one and the same—that people 
comprehend ideas passively and effortlessly; however, labeling an idea true or false (i.e. 
believing or disbelieving the idea) is something that requires willful action by the mind 
(Descartes, 1644/1985). Unlike a Spinozan processor, if a Cartesian system is prevented from 
fully processing a new bit of false information, then the person should be no more likely to 
act as if the false information is true than he or she would be to act as if the false information 
is false. Essentially, Descartes argued that people do not have a default assumption of truth; 
indeed, Descartes' philosophy states that people do not have a default assumption at all. The 
Cartesian position thus predicts that alibi evaluators would begin with an assumption of 
neutrality. 
Because the essential difference between Spinozan and Cartesian belief systems is 
their starting point, it is useful to examine how one group of psychologists has set about 
identifying which system (and starting point) people really have. Through several studies 
(Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993) Gilbert and colleagues 
used the cognitive busyness paradigm to prevent participants' processing from being 
completed and to force premature output of their evaluations. In this paradigm, participants 
are given information to remember, some of it true and some of it false. For example, in the 
'Hopi language experiment,' participants see phrases defining 'Hopi' words (which are 
actually nonsense words). Shortly after the phrase is presented, they learn either that the 
phrase is true or false. Cognitively busy participants are given an additional task to perform 
while they are attempting to learn the 'Hopi' words. Later they are asked to recall the phrases 
and identify each word and its definition as true or false. Gilbert and colleagues reasoned that 
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if the mind works in a Spinozan fashion, then making participants cognitively busy would 
allow them to comprehend a statement (which involves believing the idea to be true) but 
should prevent them from undergoing the second step of disbelieving an idea, or tagging the 
idea as false. According to this reasoning, cognitively busy Spinozan processors should err in 
the direction of identifying the false phrases as true. In contrast, if the mind works in a 
Cartesian fashion, there is no reason to hypothesize any directional pattern of errors. Gilbert 
and colleagues showed consistently that people are Spinozan processors—without sufficient 
resources to disbelieve an idea, their participants tended to behave as if the false idea were 
true. In the case of alibi evaluators, then, it makes sense to hypothesize that their starting 
point reflects the assumption of truth—they believe the alibi provider's story is true, and only 
later in the evaluation process do they integrate their knowledge that the story is an alibi and 
alter their judgment to be more skeptical. 
Alternatively, skepticism could enter alibi judgments early in the processing of an 
alibi. If alibi evaluators assume that the alibi provider is actually guilty of the crime and is 
lying when telling his or her story, evaluators would begin with an assumption of deception. 
An assumption of deception regarding the alibi provider is not implausible; Cacioppo and 
Bemtson (1994) noted that if a source of a message is known to be a liar, statements from 
that source are not assumed to be true by recipients. A possible explanation for the 
assumption of deception comes from Skumik, Moskowitz, and Johnson (2003), who take 
issue with Gilbert's (1991, 1993) explanation of how people might come to erroneously 
report that false information is true. According to Skumik et al.'s framework, when people 
are uncertain about the source of a given piece of information (when they are unsure if it is 
true or false), they use preexisting knowledge and general beliefs about the likelihood that 
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the information is true to determine if the information is true or false. Skumik et al. (2003) 
were able to manipulate participants' general likelihood beliefs about the prevalence of true 
and false information in their experimental sessions. They did this by having participants 
learn phrases as in Gilbert et al.'s (1990) 'Hopi language experiment' during an initial 
session of the experiment. Participants in mostly-true conditions saw 2/3 true phrases and 1/3 
false phrases, whereas participants in mostly-false conditions saw 1/3 true phrases and 2/3 
false phrases. Participants were asked to recall the phrases and identify them as true or false. 
After the initial learning/recall session, participants began a second (and ostensibly unrelated) 
learning session of phrases. In the second session, some participants were made cognitively 
busy (by listening for sequences of odd numbers over headphones) while attempting to learn 
the phrases. Note that the second session consisted of 'A true phrases and Vi false phrases. 
When asked to identify the true and false items they had studied, cognitively-busy 
participants' judgments reflected their general likelihood beliefs about the prevalence of true 
items: Similar to Gilbert and colleagues' findings, participants who had previously 
encountered mostly true information mistakenly judged more false items as true. However, 
participants who had previously encountered mostly false information made the opposite 
mistake—they mistakenly judged more true items as false. If alibi evaluators have and use a 
general belief that alibi providers are deceptive, they would begin from a starting point of 
disbelief in the alibi and may insufficiently adjust their belief upon hearing a strong alibi. 
The cognitive busyness paradigm was used by Gilbert and Skumik and their 
colleagues to investigate a default setting of the human processing system: in their case, 
belief in an idea. I used the cognitive busyness paradigm to examine a similar problem: 
namely, the starting point of people who attempt to evaluate an alibi. By preventing 
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evaluators from undergoing extensive processing of the alibi and then asking them to 
evaluate the alibi, I hoped to gain some insight into the starting point from which evaluators 
begin. I predicted that non-cognitively-busy participants should exhibit a similar pattern of 
believability ratings as the participants in Olson and Wells (2004a): They would judge the 
weak alibi as less believable than the strong alibi. However, the cognitively-busy participants 
would be prevented from thoroughly processing the alibi and should be unable to revise their 
initial beliefs about the alibi. I hypothesized that cognitively-busy participants start from an 
initial assumption of deception; thus, cognitive busyness should produce little or no reduction 
in belief ratings of the weak alibi, but busyness should primarily serve to lower belief ratings 
for the strong alibi. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 184 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
university recruited for an experiment entitled "The Psychology of Belief." Participants 
earned extra credit in psychology classes for their participation. All participants were treated 
in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American 
Psychological Association, 2002). 
Design. The design for Experiment 1 was a 2 x 2 between-subjects design: 
Participants were randomly assigned to be presented with an alibi story supported by either 
weak evidence or strong evidence. Participants were also randomly assigned to be either 
cognitively busy (with a visual search task) or not cognitively busy (with no additional task). 
Stimulus Materials. Participants watched one of two videos: A person giving either a 
weak alibi or a strong alibi. The alibi provider in the video was a 25-year-old Caucasian male 
seated in front of a white wall, talking to someone off-camera. The videotaped alibis 
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followed the same script, except for statements made by the off-camera investigator. In the 
weak alibi video, the investigator interrupted the alibi provider to state that his sister was 
uncertain of the day she saw him, and again to state that the clerk at the store did not 
remember him specifically (see Appendix A for the script). In the strong alibi video, the 
investigator interrupted the alibi provider to state that his sister was very certain of the day 
and time she saw him, and again to state that the purchase he claimed to have made was on 
his credit card statement (see Appendix B for the script). Pretesting of the videos indicated 
that participants rated the strong alibi as stronger than the weak alibi (mean ratings 4.15 and 
3.38 on a 7-point scale, respectively; t(42) = 2.07, SE = 0.37,p< .05). Each video was 
approximately four minutes long, presented in a 4" wide x 3" high window on a computer 
screen. 
A scrolling number line appeared below the video. The line consisted of random 
single digits, spaced approximately 'A-inch apart, scrolling at a moderate speed 
(approximately one new digit every second) from below the right corner of the video window 
to below the left corner of the video window. Sequences of three odd digits appeared at an 
average rate of one sequence every 12 seconds. For the weak alibi video, a total of 21 
sequences appeared; for the strong alibi video, 18 sequences appeared. The slight difference 
in the number of odd-digit sequences is due to differences in the amount of time the 
investigator spoke during her interruptions, making the weak alibi video slightly longer than 
the strong alibi video. 
Procedure. Approximately half the participants (n = 91) viewed the videotaped alibi 
with weak supporting evidence, and half (n = 93) viewed the videotaped alibi with strong 
supporting evidence. Participants in the cognitively-busy conditions were asked to search for 
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sequences of three odd numbers in the number line and to mentally note how many 
sequences they saw. Participants in the not-cognitively-busy conditions were asked to ignore 
the number line. When the video finished, participants were instructed, via computer screen, 
to answer all questions as quickly as possible. Questions were then presented via a computer 
program. When participants finished the questionnaires, they were debriefed by the 
experimenter, thanked, and dismissed. 
Dependent Measures. For the primary dependent measure, immediately after 
watching the alibi video participants rated the alibi on an 11-point Likert-type scale of 
believability (0=1 do not believe him at all, 10 = 7 believe him completely, hereafter called 
the belief measure). Participants were also asked to rate on an 11-point Likert-type scale how 
believable they thought a detective would find the alibi (0 = not at all, 10 = completely 
believable-, hereafter called the detective belief measure). Participants then rated how strong 
they thought the person's alibi was on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1- very weak, 7 - very 
strong; hereafter called the alibi strength rating). 
Participants also rated the alibi provider on how much he was described by each of 
the 20 traits first used by Olson and Wells (2004a). Twelve of these traits were considered to 
be relevant to the believability of the alibi provider (i.e., calculating, conniving, cunning, 
deceitful, honest, intelligent, loyal, open, scheming, sincere, suspicious, trustworthy); these 
were significantly correlated with believability in Olson and Wells (2004a). Eight were 
considered to be irrelevant to the believability of the alibi provider (i.e., ambitious, caring, 
content, curious, friendly, funny, shrewd, shy); these were not significantly correlated with 
believability in the Olson and Wells (2004a) study. For ease of analysis, I followed these trait 
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divisions in the current study. Traits were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = does not 
describe this suspect at all, 7 = describes this suspect perfectly). 
Lastly, participants in the cognitively-busy conditions were asked how many 
sequences of three odd digits they counted. All participants were asked two manipulation-
check questions to determine if they heard and understood the information in the detective's 
interruptions that made the alibi either strong or weak. The first question asked, "When the 
detective said she talked to the man's sister, what was the sister's reaction?" Participants 
could answer "A: The sister was pretty sure she had called her brother for help that Saturday" 
or "B: The sister was quite certain her brother fixed her car that Saturday." For the weak alibi 
video, option A is correct and for the strong alibi video, option B is correct. The second 
question asked, "What did the detective say regarding the man's visit to the NAPA store?" 
Participants could answer "A: The man's purchase was listed on his credit card records" or 
"B: The clerk at NAPA remembered the purchase and did not recognize the man's picture." 
For the weak alibi video, option B is correct and for the strong alibi video, option A is 
correct. 
Results 
The Belief Measure. Participants rated "How much do you believe this person's 
alibi?" on an 11-point Likert-type scale. Means and standard deviations can be seen in Table 
1. For effect sizes, Cohen's /is reported, and a small effect is 0.15, a medium effect is 0.25, 
and a large effect is 0.40 (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). There was no interaction between 
cognitive busyness and alibi strength F(l, 180) = 0.74,p > .05,MSE = 4.22, Cohen's/= 
0.06. Likewise, there was no main effect for cognitive busyness F(l, 180) = 0.38,/) > .05, 
Cohen's/ = 0.05. However, there was a main effect for alibi strength: participants rated the 
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strong alibi as more believable than the weak alibi F(1, 180) = 28.61, p < .05, Cohen's/-
0.40. 
Table 1. Mean belief measure ratings as a function of cognitive busyness and alibi strength 
Belief Rating (0=1 do not believe him at all, 10=7 believe him completely) 
Cognitive Busyness 
Alibi Strength Busy Not Busy Total 
Weak 5.50(2.22) 5.57 (1.83) 5.54 (2.01) 
Strong 7.38 (1.96) 6.93 (2.21) 7.16(2.08) 
Total 6.47 (2.28) 6.25 (2.12) 
Detective Belief Rating (0 = not at all, 10 = completely believable) 
Cognitive Busyness 
Alibi Strength Busy Not Busy Total 
Weak 4.80 (2.09) 4.38 (1.85) 4.58 (1.97) 
Strong 6.66 (1.75) 6.37 (2.47) 6.52(2.13) 
Total 5.76(2.13) 5.37 (2.39) 
Alibi Strength Rating (1 = very weak, 7 = very strong) 
Cognitive Busyness 
Alibi Strength Busy Not Busy Total 
Weak 3.47(1.28) 3.23 (1.40) 3.35 (1.34) 
Strong 4.66 (1.29) 4.52 (1.46) 4.59(1.37) 
Total 4.09(1.41) 3.87(1.56) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses 
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The Detective Belief Measure. Participants rated "How believable do you think a 
detective would find this alibi?" on an 11-point Likert-type scale. Means and standard 
deviations can be seen in Table 1. There was no interaction between cognitive busyness and 
alibi strength F(l, 180) = 0.04,p > .05, MSE = 4.22, Cohen's/= 0.02. Likewise, there was 
no main effect for cognitive busyness F(l, 180) = 1.34,/? > .05, Cohen's f= 0.09. However, 
there was a main effect for alibi strength: participants thought a detective would find the 
strong alibi more believable than the weak alibi F(l, 180) - 40.38,/? < .05, Cohen's/= 0.47. 
The Alibi Strength Rating. Participants rated "How strong do you think this person's 
alibi was?" on a 7-point Likert-type scale. Means and standard deviations can be seen in 
Table 1. There was no interaction between cognitive busyness and alibi strength F( 1, 180) = 
0.07,p > .05, MSE = 1.85, Cohen's/= 0.02. Likewise, there was no main effect for cognitive 
busyness 7^(1, 180) = 0.90,/? > .05, Cohen's f= 0.07. However, there was a main effect for 
alibi strength such that the strong alibi was rated as stronger than the weak alibi F(l, 180) = 
37.85,/? < .05, Cohen's/= 0.46. 
The Trait Ratings. The trait ratings were divided into the two categories, relevant 
traits and irrelevant traits, used by Olson and Wells (2004a). Correlations among the 
individual trait ratings and the three main measures can be seen in Table 2. Positive traits 
(honest, open, sincere, trustworthy, loyal, intelligent, content, caring, curious, friendly, 
ambitious, funny) were reverse-coded so that all scores carried a negative connotation (i.e., 
trustworthy became untrustworthy). Traits were then averaged to yield composite scores for 
both relevant and irrelevant traits (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations; Table 4 for 
correlations with the belief measures). There was no interaction between cognitive busyness, 
alibi strength, and type of trait ^(1, 180) = 0.01, MSE = 0.25, p > .05, Cohen's/= 0. 
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Likewise, there was no main effect of cognitive busyness on participants' trait ratings F( 1, 
180) = 1.57,p > .05, Cohen's / = 0.09. However, as seen in the main measures, there was a 
main effect of alibi strength on participants' ratings, such that participants rated the alibi 
provider who gave the strong alibi more favorably than the alibi provider who gave the weak 
alibi ^(1, 180) = 33.02, p < .05, Cohen's /= 0.43. 
Table 2. Correlations among belief measures and individual trait ratings 
Main Measures 
Belief Detective Belief Alibi Strength 
Relevant Traits 
Conniving -0.05 -0.13 -0.08 
Calculating 0.02 0.04 -0.01 
Deceitful -0.27* -0.34* -0.35* 
Suspicious -0.56* -0.53* -0.45* 
Cunning -0.21* -0.25* -0.30* 
Scheming -0.36* -0.45* -0.39* 
Honest 0.66* 0.67* 0.70* 
Open 0.46* 0.45* 0.44* 
Sincere 0.52* 0.52* 0.59* 
Trustworthy 0.50* 0.59* 0.58* 
Loyal 0.47* 0.53* 0.56* 
Intelligent 0.40* 0.43* 0.43* 
Irrelevant Traits 
Shrewd -0.17* -0.24* -0.25* 
Shy -0.06 -0.11 0.02 
Content 0.37* 0.35* 0.32* 
Caring 0.25* 0.28* 0.32* 
Curious 0.00 0.07 0.05 
Friendly 0.31* 0.33* 0.30* 
Ambitious 0.25* 0.26* 0.29* 
Funny 0.30* 0.36* 0.27* 
Note: Correlations marked with * are significant atp< .05. 
Table 3. Mean composite trait ratings as a fonction of cognitive busyness and alibi strength 
Relevant Traits 
Cognitive Busyness 
Alibi Strength Busy Not Busy Total 
Weak 4.17(0.65) 4.45 (0.70) 4.31 (0.69) 
Strong 3.74 (0.86) 3.71 (0.82) 3.73 (0.84) 
Total 3.95 (0.79) 4.08 (0.84) 
Irrelevant Traits 
Cognitive Busyness 
Alibi Strength Busy Not Busy Total 
Weak 4.23 (0.62) 4.51 (0.73) 4.38 (0.69) 
Strong 3.88 (0.80) 3.83 (0.68) 3.85 (0.74) 
Total 4.05 (0.73) 4.17(0.78) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. All traits coded to have a negative 
connotation; higher composite scores mean a more negative evaluation. 
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Table 4. Correlations among composite trait ratings and belief measures as a function of 
cognitive busyness 
Belief Rating 
Cognitive Busyness 
Traits Busy Not Busy 
Relevant -0.65* -0.57* 
Irrelevant1 -0.56* -0.24* 
Detective Belief Rating 
Cognitive Busyness 
Traits Busy Not Busy 
Relevant -0.54* -0.39* 
Irrelevant -0.63* -0.69* 
Alibi Strength Rating 
Cognitive Busyness 
Traits Busy Not Busy 
Relevant -0.48* -0.35* 
Irrelevant -0.61* -0.72* 
Note: Correlations marked with a (*) are significant, p < .05. 
1 Correlations across rows significantly different from one another,p < .05. 
Manipulation Check Measures. Participants in the cognitively-busy conditions were 
asked to report how many sequences of three odd digits they counted. Two participants in the 
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weak alibi video condition reported an extreme number of sequences (81 and 115) and were 
removed from the analysis.1 A boxplot of the distribution of remaining reports may be seen 
in Figure 1. Participants reported counting a mean of 2.88 (SD = 6.64) fewer sequences than 
actually appeared in the weak alibi video and a mean of 2.32 (SD = 5.73) fewer sequences 
than actually appeared in the strong alibi video. These difference scores did not significantly 
differ from each other /(87) - 0.43, SE- 1.31,/? > .05. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Number of Sequences Reported as a Function of Alibi Strength 
1 Examination of other responses by these two participants did not indicate unusual responses to any of the other 
measures. It is likely that these extreme responses were the result of keying error by the participants, i.e. that a 
participant intended to answer "11" or "15" but instead typed a "115." With no way to know their true intention, 
I excluded these two participants from the sequence analysis. 
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Participants were also asked two multiple-choice manipulation check questions 
regarding the detective's interruptions in the video. Participants could respond to each 
question by choosing one of two options, one of which was correct for the weak alibi video 
and one of which was correct for the strong alibi video. In the weak alibi video condition, all 
participants answered both questions correctly. In the strong alibi video condition, 2 
cognitively-busy participants and 6 non-cognitively-busy participants answered one of the 
two questions incorrectly while the remaining 43 participants answered both questions 
correctly. 
Lastly, I examined the time which participants took to answer the first question 
following the video, the belief measure. Participants had been instructed to answer the 
questions following the video as quickly as possible and were also required to keep in mind 
the number of three-odd-digit sequences they had counted, so that they might continue to be 
cognitively busy while answering the main measures. However, if participants took a 
considerable amount of time to answer the initial questions following the video, they might 
have been able to negate the effects of cognitive busyness by thinking deeply about the 
video. Participants in the cognitively-busy conditions took an average of 6.95 seconds (SD = 
4.62) to answer the belief measure, whereas participants in the not-cognitively-busy 
conditions took an average of 6.65 seconds (SD = 3.62) to answer the belief measure. There 
was no effect of cognitive busyness on time taken to answer the belief measure F( 1, 180) = 
0.04, MSE =0.19,/? >.05. 
Discussion 
As mentioned earlier, alibi evaluators may begin with any of several starting points. I 
hypothesized that evaluators, because of the power of the concept of'alibi,' would begin 
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from an assumption of deception, assuming that the alibi provider is lying and is guilty of the 
crime. In the case of a weak alibi, evaluators' judgments of belief in the alibi would not need 
to be revised very much; however, in the case of a strong alibi, judgments of belief would be 
considerably higher than the initial assumption. In the event that evaluators are prevented 
from fully considering evidence (in the current experiment, by cognitive busyness), I would 
expect that judgments of belief in both strong and weak alibis to be very similar. Thus I 
would expect an interaction effect: in the absence of busyness, participants should rate strong 
alibis as more believable than weak alibis; cognitive busyness should produce little or no 
reduction in belief ratings for weak alibis but would primarily lower belief ratings for strong 
alibis, resulting in a smaller difference in ratings between weak and strong alibis in the busy 
conditions than the non-busy conditions. This is not consistent with the data; instead, the data 
show a main effect of alibi strength, with no main effect of cognitive busyness and no 
interaction. 
An alternative hypothesis was that alibi evaluators could begin from an assumption of 
truth, assuming the alibi provider is telling the truth and is not guilty of the crime. From an 
assumption of truth, evaluators' judgments of a strong alibi would not need to be revised very 
much, but judgments of a weak alibi would rate the alibi as less believable than the initial 
assumption. In this case, I would also expect an interaction effect: in the absence of busyness, 
participants should rate strong alibis as more believable than weak alibis; cognitive busyness 
should produce little or no reduction in belief ratings for strong alibis but would primarily 
raise belief ratings for weak alibis, resulting in a smaller difference in ratings between weak 
and strong alibis in the busy conditions than the non-busy conditions. This is also not 
consistent with the data, which show only a main effect of alibi strength. 
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One might be tempted to conclude that if participants do not seem to be beginning 
with an assumption of deception or an assumption of truth, then they must be adopting an 
assumption of neutrality, assuming that the alibi is neither untrue nor true. However, the data 
do not support this conclusion, either; for an assumption of neutrality I would also expect to 
see an interaction effect. In the absence of busyness, participants should rate strong alibis as 
more believable than weak alibis; cognitive busyness should produce a reduction in belief 
ratings for strong alibis and an increase in belief ratings for weak alibis, resulting in a smaller 
difference in ratings between weak and strong alibis in the busy conditions than the non-busy 
conditions. The data do not show this pattern. 
So what was really happening here? One possibility, of course, is that the cognitive 
busyness manipulation did not adequately tax participants, and they were able to fully 
process the alibi at the same level as non-cognitively-busy participants. However, I do not 
believe that this is the case. The task was modeled after a cognitive-busyness task used in 
Gilbert et al. (1993) in which participants scanned a number line for single digits. Informal 
pretesting and tweaking of the task for the current experiment with several participants and 
research assistants resulted in a sequence-searching task that was difficult to perform while 
processing the alibi, but was not so taxing as to destroy participants' ability to attend to the 
alibi story while keeping a reasonably accurate count in the sequence-search task. I believe 
the busyness manipulation did work insofar as it disrupted careful scrutiny of the alibi story. 
One of the assumptions on which my original hypotheses rested was that the 
evaluation of alibis requires careful scrutiny, and that without this careful scrutiny, the 
starting point from which alibi evaluators begin would more strongly influence the final 
judgments of the evaluators. However, careful scrutiny might not have been necessary for the 
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evaluation of the alibi in the experiment. For example, cognitively-busy participants may 
have been able to arrive at similar judgments as non-cognitively-busy participants because 
the videotaped alibi used in this experiment did much or most of the inferential work for 
them. The videotaped alibi detailed a linear story with a script many college students would 
be familiar with (trying and failing to get homework done on a Saturday), and the alibi 
evidence was presented in a straightforward fashion by the detective in the video. Perhaps 
inferences about the strength of the alibi were easily made once participants comprehended 
the alibi—because the alibi was not complex enough. 
Alternatively, cognitively-busy participants may have been able to arrive at similar 
judgments as non-cognitively-busy participants by using simple cues rather than the deeper 
level of evidence offered in support of the alibi. This research assumed that alibi evaluators 
adjust from their initial assumptions through an effortful consideration of the evidence and 
story of the alibi, i.e., centrally-processing the alibi, to borrow from the elaboration-
likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It is possible, however, that 
evaluators may adjust from their initial assumptions through a far less effortful, nearly 
automatic impression of the alibi story and alibi provider, i.e., peripherally-processing the 
alibi. This kind of heuristic processing could conceivably lead evaluators to make judgments 
similar to those made under more effortful processing. For instance, the tone of voice of the 
detective as she makes her statements about the evidence may have been a simple cue to 
cognitively-busy evaluators that the alibi was or was not particularly strong. The nonverbal 
reactions of the alibi provider to the statements of the detective could also serve as a 
peripheral cue to cognitively-busy evaluators. The current experiment differs from many 
cognitive busyness experiments in that it used a stimulus with more potential peripheral, 
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simple cues than many experiments. For example, Gilbert et al. (1990) and Skurnik et al. 
(2003) used as stimulus materials phrases in which participants learned the definitions of 
nonsense words. While reading these phrases, participants were working with purely verbal, 
written information and thus had no peripheral information on which they might base a 
judgment. In the current experiment, however, participants were faced with a video of a 
person providing an alibi—giving them visual, nonverbal, and verbal information, some of it 
peripheral to the content of the alibi. In the persuasion literature, cognitively-busy message 
recipients are generally unable to centrally-process a message but can still process, and be 
influenced by, peripheral cues (see Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). I will refer to the idea 
that heuristic processing could lead alibi evaluators to make judgments similar to those made 
under more effortful processing as the superficial-evaluation hypothesis. 
The pattern of correlations of the individual trait measures to the belief ratings offers 
some support for the superficial-evaluation hypothesis. The irrelevant traits should be 
irrelevant to the evaluation of an alibi if the evaluator is restricting his or her judgment to the 
central facts of the case. If, on the other hand, evaluators are forming more general 
impressions of the alibi provider from peripheral cues, I would expect a more generalized 
halo phenomenon (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In the case of a strong alibi, superficial 
evaluators would rate the alibi as more believable and also would have a positive overall 
impression of the alibi provider, rating him highly on positive traits and less highly on 
negative traits, even those irrelevant to the alibi. In the case of a weak alibi, superficial 
evaluators would rate the alibi as less believable and also would have a negative overall 
impression of the alibi provider, rating him highly on the negative traits and less highly on 
positive traits, even those irrelevant to the alibi. Thus I would expect the belief rating to be 
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more highly correlated with the irrelevant traits in cognitively-busy conditions (where 
presumably a superficial evaluation is taking place) than in non-cognitively-busy conditions. 
As seen in Table 4, this is indeed the case: The irrelevant traits were correlated with belief to 
a significantly greater degree in the busy conditions than in the non-busy conditions, z -
2.59, p < .05, one-tailed. This pattern does not hold for the detective belief or alibi strength 
measure, but these measures are qualitatively different than the belief measure—the belief 
measure asked participants about their own belief in the alibi, whereas the detective belief 
and strength measures asked participants for a more remote type of judgment. 
The superficial-evaluation hypothesis at first appears inconsistent with participants' 
answers to the multiple-choice manipulation check questions—after all, nearly all 
cognitively-busy participants answered both questions correctly. However, the manipulation 
check questions do not definitively rule out the possibility that participants were relying on 
peripheral cues to make their evaluations. If participants had heuristically formed an 
impression of the alibi, they could easily infer from the two options in each question which 
option referred to a weak alibi and which option referred to a strong alibi. For example, the 
first manipulation check question asked, "When the detective said she talked to the man's 
sister, what was the sister's reaction?" Participants could answer "A: The sister was pretty 
sure she had called her brother for help that Saturday" or "B: The sister was quite certain her 
brother fixed her car that Saturday." Even without specifically recalling what the detective 
said during the video (due to being cognitively busy), a participant with an impression that 
the alibi was weak would choose answer A, which is in fact correct for the weak alibi video. 
A participant with an impression that the alibi was strong would choose answer B, the correct 
answer for the strong alibi video. The second manipulation check question asked, "What did 
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the detective say regarding the man's visit to the NAPA store?" Faced with the choices "A: 
The man's purchase was listed on his credit card records" or "B: The clerk at NAPA 
remembered the purchase and did not recognize the man's picture," a participant with an 
impression that the alibi was strong would likely choose answer A, the correct option for the 
strong alibi video. A participant with an impression that the alibi was weak would choose 
answer B, the correct option for the weak alibi video. 
I believe the cognitive busyness manipulation worked to disrupt close scrutiny of the 
alibi by evaluators. Unanticipated in this experiment was the possibility that people can 
evaluate alibis (by making judgments about the strength of the alibi) based on simple cues— 
perhaps perceived nervousness of the alibi provider or possible skepticism in the tone of the 
interviewer. The only taxonomy to classify alibis according to their believability completely 
neglects the potential role of peripheral cues in alibi evaluation (Olson & Wells, 2004a). In 
their work, Olson and Wells assume the alibi evaluator operates almost completely on the 
content of the alibi and uses careful scrutiny to make an evaluation. The findings of the 
current experiment suggest possibilities for future research. For instance, the superficial-
evaluation hypothesis suggests that the method used for studying alibi evaluation could be 
more important than first realized—asking evaluators to read an alibi statement would miss 
the potential peripheral cues that a videotaped alibi would provide, and perhaps an interaction 
situation with a participant as the interviewer would more closely capture the complexities of 
the alibi situation. However, the findings of the current experiment also mean this experiment 
cannot speak definitively about the starting point from which alibi evaluators begin their 
evaluations or to the idea that people are generally skeptical about alibis. Using a different 
methodological approach, perhaps Experiment 2 can speak to the alibi skepticism hypothesis. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: USING MEMORY TO INFER 
HOW EVALUATORS PROCESS ALIBIS 
The starting point—be it an assumption of deception or an assumption of truth—from 
which the alibi evaluator begins his or her evaluation could conceivably have a substantial 
impact on the subsequent processing of the alibi. I propose that evaluators tend to organize an 
alibi story in a different fashion than they organize an average autobiographical account. First 
it would be useful to look at how people generally organize narrative information in memory 
and compare that to how alibi information might be organized differently. 
Narrative information, such as a story told by a friend, is often organized in a 
schematic fashion. Schémas are generic memory structures that represent knowledge about a 
concept or stimulus (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Schémas may be thought 
of as knowledge structures used to organize and comprehend information—containing 'slots' 
for important elements and making those elements more likely to be learned (Anderson & 
Pichert, 1978). Scripts are a specialized type of schema: Fiske and Taylor (1991) defined a 
script as an event schema which may or may not delineate the sequence of a well-known 
situation. Although most Americans have not had experience providing an alibi in a legal 
situation, I would argue that people generally have a fairly detailed schema, perhaps even a 
script, for alibis. Fictional alibis are shown being given and evaluated in movies and on 
television programs; real-life alibis are discussed in newspaper and television news coverage 
of local and national criminal cases. An alibi schema might involve 'slots' for features of the 
alibi provider, the detective inquiring about the alibi, the time period the detective is 
interested in, and the alibi story that is provided. Activation of the alibi schema may also 
activate a number of related concepts, like deception and criminality. It is not unreasonable, 
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then, to hypothesize that evaluators would be suspicious of an alibi. According to Duller and 
Burgeon's (1996) interpersonal deception theory, suspicious people tend to exhibit a 'lie-
bias;' that is, suspicious people tend to judge a storyteller as lying even when the storyteller 
is telling the truth. Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, and Rockwell (1994) noted that suspicion alters 
an evaluator's attention and attributions, possibly introducing processing errors into an 
evaluator's memory for the interaction. Schul, Burnstein, and Bardi (1996) noted that 
suspicious people tend to encode information in ways that make it easier to discount the 
information when they find out it is untrue (see also Schul, 1993). Successful discounting is 
more likely when a person can generate a plausible counterscenario, or alternative 
explanation. As mentioned earlier, the "alibi provider is lying" explanation for an alibi is an 
easily generated alternative explanation and is likely to be salient to alibi evaluators. 
According to schema theory as outlined by Alba and Hasher (1983), once a schema is 
activated, information is selectively encoded into memory according to its relevance to the 
active schema; more relevant information is encoded and remembered more easily than less 
relevant information. Anderson and Pichert (1978; see also Pichert & Anderson, 1977) asked 
participants to read a story about two boys playing in a house from either the perspective of a 
home buyer interested buying in the house or that of a burglar interested in burgling the 
house—that is, they induced one of two schémas in their participants. They found that 
participants recalled more information relevant to their perspective than information relevant 
to the opposite perspective. Wyer, Srull, Gordon, and Hartwick (1982) obtained similar 
results: participants who were given one of the two schémas before reading the story recalled 
more schema-relevant information and less schema-irrelevant information than those who did 
not have a schema prior to reading the story. This evidence suggests that to the extent that 
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participants have an active alibi schema, they will encode and recall information consistent 
with that schema. Thus, evaluators should pay special attention to information relating to the 
time of the crime, the places the alibi provider said he or she was, and the types of proof the 
alibi provider brings to support the alibi. Priester and Petty (1995) showed that people engage 
in deeper message scrutiny when the source of the message is of questionable honesty, and 
the nature of an alibi renders the source of that alibi a person of questionable honesty. Alibi 
schema effects and increased scrutiny of the alibi story would result in an evaluator more 
successfully encoding and recalling details central to the alibi and less successfully encoding 
and recalling details peripheral to the alibi. 
The knowledge that the story is an alibi story could also arouse expectations about the 
alibi and the alibi provider, possibly influencing how evaluators encode and recall alibi 
information. Much of the past research on the effects of expectations on perception, belief, 
and memory has involved only expectations regarding the self (see Kunda, 1990, for a 
review). People tend to report that past attitudes and behaviors are more consistent with their 
current expectations, attitudes, and behavior patterns than they actually were. Ross and 
Conway (1986) proposed a model of autobiographical recall in which people tend to use their 
present standing on personal attributes as an anchor from which to work. People then 
reconstruct their past attitudes and behaviors using their present-oriented anchor and their 
intuitive theories about their likely change over time. 
Hirt and colleagues have since examined the effect of people's expectancies on 
beliefs (Hirt, 1990) and memory (Hirt, McDonald, & Erickson, 1995; McDonald & Hirt, 
1997) for another target person other than the self. Hirt (1990) argued in his general model of 
reconstructive memory that memory for other people works in the same fashion as memory 
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for the self—during retrieval (and thus reconstruction of the memory), people integrate 
information from three sources: the original memory trace, the present information, and an 
expectancy regarding possible change between the past and present. Much like an 
expectation about how the self has changed over time can bias processing and recall to 
influence reports of past behavior, an expectation about another person can bias processing 
and memory to influence reports about the other person's behavior. For instance, McDonald 
and Hirt (1997) gave participants information about a student's (Joe's) midterm scores in a 
class. They then produced an expectancy that Joe's grades would improve over time or 
decline over time. When given Joe's scores on the final exam, participants who expected 
improvement recalled that Joe had a lower midterm score than did participants who expected 
decline. Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) also presented evidence that expectations influence 
retrieval and reconstruction of information from memory. They presented participants with a 
case history of a woman's life. Sometime after reading the case history, participants learned 
the woman had been living either a lesbian or heterosexual lifestyle. This label influenced 
participants' memory about the events in the woman's life—when they committed memory 
errors, they erred in the direction of their new beliefs about the woman. Thus participants' 
expectations influenced the information recalled (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). In the case of 
the alibi evaluator, expectations may take the form of the assumption of disbelief—a 
skeptical anchor. 
Anchoring effects occur when people begin with a starting point (often uninformative 
or extreme) and insufficiently adjust their judgment away from that point, resulting in 
judgments that are biased in the direction of their original starting point (Epley & Gilovich, 
2002; Tver sky & Kahneman, 1974). Chapman and Johnson (2002) argued that anchoring 
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effects occur because the anchor acts as a suggestion, a transient hypothesis that the 
evaluators entertain while formulating a judgment. This in turn increases the availability of 
anchor-consistent information in memory and decreases the availability of anchor-
inconsistent information in memory. Thus if an alibi evaluator begins from an assumption of 
deception, they might recall more inconsistencies and suspicious tidbits from the alibi 
provider's story. Merely entertaining a hypothesis is often enough to increase one's 
confidence that the hypothesis is true (Koehler, 1991; Nickerson, 1998); alibi evaluators may 
also be more confident in their judgment that the alibi provider is deceptive than would 
observers who did not know it was an alibi. 
The paradigm used by Anderson and Pichert (1978) and Wyer and colleagues (1982) 
to test schema effects on memory involved providing participants with one of two schémas 
(that of a homebuyer or that of a burglar) and testing how much information the participants 
remembered. I adapted this paradigm to investigate ways in which people process a story 
they believe is an alibi as opposed to a non-alibi story. Wyer and colleagues (1982) presented 
participants with one of two schémas (processing objectives) either before reading a story or 
after reading a story. Giving participants a schema before reading a story allows one to assess 
the effects the schema had on both encoding and retrieval of the story. Giving participants a 
schema after reading a story allows one to assess the effects of the schema only on retrieval 
of the story—presumably a schema might offer cues that would aid in the search for story 
information. In the current experiment, I manipulated the schema of some of the alibi 
evaluators (by giving them information about the alibi provider); whereas I gave other alibi 
evaluators no predetermined schema. By initiating the alibi schema at different points in their 
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processing of the alibi story, I hoped to discover something about how evaluators process 
alibis as compared to other narrative accounts. 
Overview 
In the current experiment, I manipulated whether participants viewed the video as an 
alibi or whether they viewed the video as a narrative account, only discovering later that the 
video story was an alibi. An active alibi schema could bias recall toward the period of time in 
the story most relevant to the alibi—the critical time period. For instance, evaluators with an 
active alibi schema could encode the information from the critical time period differently 
than those without such a schema, paying less attention to information outside the critical 
time period. Alternatively, evaluators could selectively retrieve more information from the 
critical time period than other time periods. A third possibility indicates recall could be 
biased at both encoding and retrieval. By comparing the pattern of recall from those whose 
alibi schema was activated prior to viewing the video with the pattern of recall from those 
whose alibi schema was activated after viewing the video, I could assess the effects an 
existing alibi schema has on encoding of the story. By comparing the pattern of recall from 
those whose alibi schema was activated after viewing the video with the pattern from those 
whose alibi schema was not activated until after completing the recall measure, I could assess 
the effects of an alibi schema on retrieval of the story. Finally, comparing the pattern of those 
whose alibi schema was active prior to viewing the video with the pattern from those whose 
alibi schema was active after completing the recall measure, I could asses the effects of the 
alibi schema on both encoding and retrieval of the alibi story. I hypothesized that of all 
information recalled, the proportion of information from the critical time period would be 
greatest in conditions where participants' alibi schema was activated before viewing the 
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video, due to effects of the schema on both encoding and retrieval. I would expect that 
selective retrieval alone can also bias recall toward the critical period, but perhaps this is a 
somewhat lesser effect. 
The current experiment not only manipulated the timing of alibi schema activation 
but also manipulated what type of information participants received along with the alibi 
information. At the same time that participants were told the video was an alibi story, some 
participants were also told that the alibi provider had ultimately been found either guilty or 
innocent. Thus, some participants had directional alibi schémas, in which they knew the alibi 
provider was either lying (he was in fact guilty) or telling the truth (he was in fact innocent). 
It is less clear what to expect in the case of these directional alibi schémas. On the one hand, 
a knowledge of the actual fact of the alibi provider's innocence or guilt might nullify the 
critical-time-period recall bias—since there is no 'mystery' to the alibi, there would be no 
need for the evaluator to scrutinize the statements of the alibi provider relating to the critical 
time period. On the other hand, it is also possible that those who are told the alibi provider 
was guilty of the crime might continue to exhibit a critical-time-period bias because of their 
knowledge that the provider is lying—they would want to 'catch' him in the lie. 
Lastly, the current experiment can also speak to some degree about the default 
assumptions of alibi evaluators—does an alibi schema distort processing in some way? By 
comparing the pattern of recall of those with an alibi schema with the pattern of those with a 
directional alibi schema, I could examine whether people without knowledge of the status of 
the alibi provider exhibit a pattern of recall more similar to those who know the provider is 
guilty, or whether they exhibit a similar pattern to those who know the provider is innocent. 
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Method 
Participants. Participants were 322 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
university recruited for an experiment entitled "The Psychology of Belief " Participants 
earned extra credit in psychology classes for their participation. All participants were treated 
in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American 
Psychological Association, 2002). Due to a bug in the computer program used to collect data, 
recall data from 30 participants was not recorded. Seven other participants were excluded 
because they had previously participated in Experiment 1. These 37 participants were not 
included in the analysis, leaving a total of 285 participants. 
Design. The design for Experiment 2 was a 2 x 3 +1 factorial design, illustrated in 
Figure 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions, which varied 
according to the type of information participants were given and the timing of that 
information. 
Type of Alibi Information 
Timing of Information Alibi 
Alibi and the 
provider is Innocent 
Alibi and the 
provider is Guilty 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
Figure 2. Design of Experiment 2. 
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The type of alibi information participants received varied as follows: Participants in 
the alibi-only condition were told that the video story was an alibi. Participants in the alibi-
innocent condition were told that the video story was an alibi and the alibi provider was 
ultimately proved innocent of the crime. Participants in the alibi-guilty condition were told 
that the video story was an alibi and the alibi provider was ultimately proved guilty of the 
crime. 
The timing of the information varied as follows: Participants in the before viewing 
video conditions were told the alibi information before they saw the video, and participants in 
the after conditions were asked simply to watch a video of a person telling a story. 
Participants in the after viewing video condition were told the alibi information immediately 
following the video and prior to completing any measures. Participants in the after primary 
measures condition were told the alibi information after they had completed the recall and 
memory measures. 
Materials. All participants viewed the same video of a 25-year-old Caucasian male 
providing an alibi. The video was identical to those used in Experiment 1, except the 
investigator did not interrupt the alibi provider to discuss the evidence supporting the alibi. 
See Appendix C for the script used for the videotaped alibi. The video was approximately 
four minutes long. 
Procedure and Dependent Measures. All participants were asked to watch a video 
and form judgments about the person in the video, who was asked to talk about what he did 
the previous Saturday between 12:00 pm and 1:00 pm. Then participants were escorted into 
separate cubicles where they were seated at a computer to view the video of the alibi provider 
telling his story. At this time, participants in the before viewing video conditions were given 
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the alibi information. After the video ended, participants in the after viewing video conditions 
were given the alibi information. All participants were then given a 5-minute distractor task 
(completing mazes on the computer). 
After participants completed the distractor task, they were asked to report as much of 
the alibi as they could remember (adapted from Wyer et al., 1982): 
A final thing we are interested in is how well people are able to recall information 
they receive. In the space below, please type as much of the original material from the 
video as exactly as you can. If you cannot remember the exact words used but you do 
remember its meaning, type the phrase as close to the original as possible. You will 
have 10 minutes to work. Please be sure to include every bit of the material you can 
remember, no matter how inconsequential it may seem. 
As a manipulation check, 154 participants were randomly assigned to answer a group of 15 
multiple-choice questions (hereafter referred to as the multiple-choice memory test) regarding 
what they remembered from the video (see Appendix D for the questions). Participants in the 
after primary measures condition were then given the alibi information, and all participants 
were then asked the same measures as in Experiment 1 regarding their belief in the alibi and 
their trait ratings of the alibi provider. 
After participants completed all measures, they were fully debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
Results 
The Recall Measure: Scoring. To create a scoring scheme for the recall paragraphs, 
four independent raters parsed the video script into idea units, the smallest units of speech, or 
phrases, that convey a complete idea. Disagreements about specific phrases were discussed 
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and a consensus was reached. These phrases were then categorized into three blocks 
corresponding to one of the three time-frames of the story: 11:00-12:00, 12:00-1:00 (the 
critical time period, relevant to the alibi), and 1:00-2:00 (see Appendix C for phrase breaks 
and time block breaks). There were 19 phrases in the 11-12 time block, 28 phrases in the 12-
1 time block, and 23 phrases in the 1-2 time block. Thus, phrases from the critical time 
period made up 40% of the total possible phrases to be recalled. 
Then two independent scoring raters (separate from the parsing raters) scored each 
recall paragraph. Raters were kept blind to the condition to which participants had been 
assigned, and they used a scoring sheet with the phrases and time blocks the parsing raters 
had created. Raters scored the recall paragraphs as follows (see Appendix E for mean recall 
scores): If participants reported a phrase exactly as it was stated in the video, that phrase was 
given a score of 2. If participants reported the gist of the phrase as it was stated in the video 
(but did not report the phrase exactly), that phrase was given a score of 1. Each time block 
thus received two scores from each rater: a perfect recall score, the frequency with which 
phrases were scored a 2, and a gist recall score, the frequency with which phrases were 
scored a 1. Interrater reliability for the perfect recall score was 0.88, 0.84, and 0.87 for the 
11-12, 12-1, and 1-2 time blocks, respectively. Reliability for the gist recall score was 0.69, 
0.58, and 0.67 for the 11-12, 12-1, and 1-2 time blocks, respectively. 
The gist recall score and the perfect recall score were then summed to yield the total 
recall score for each time block; thus, perfect recall was weighted more heavily in the total 
recall score than gist recall. Interrater reliability for the total recall score was 0.96, 0.94, and 
0.94 for the 11-12, 12-1, and 1-2 time blocks, respectively. Because they showed the greatest 
interrater reliability, I used the total recall scores in the following analyses and averaged the 
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total recall score from both raters to achieve a composite total recall score for each recall 
paragraph. Summing the total recall scores from all time blocks yielded an overall recall 
score, which was used to calculate the critical time bias score, which was the proportion of 
overall recall that came from the 12-1 time block (the time period critical to the alibi). The 
critical time bias score was calculated by taking the total recall score from the 12-1 time 
block and dividing by the overall recall score (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Critical time bias score (proportion of total information recalled from the critical 
time period) as a fonction of type and timing of alibi information 
Type of Alibi Information 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
.47 (.13) 
.42 (.09) 
.42 (.10) 
.43 (.11) 
.46 (.13) 
.40 (.09) 
.44 (.10) 
.43 (.11) 
.44 (.11) 
Total .44 (.11) .45 (.12) .42 (.10) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
The Recall Measure: Analysis. There was no theoretical reason to believe that overall 
recall would differ among the conditions of the experiment, and indeed participants across 
conditions did not differ in the overall amount of information they recalled F(6, 278) = 0.76, 
MSE = 299.79, p > .05. The hypotheses for this experiment concerned the relative amount of 
recall from the critical time period compared to the non-critical time periods; thus the 
primary analyses were conducted on the critical time bias score. Did the timing and type of 
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alibi information make a difference in the amount of information recalled from the critical 
time period? An overall oneway ANOVA revealed a significant effect F(6, 277) = 2.60, MSE 
= 0.01,/? < .05. Thus, a series of planned comparisons were then conducted to investigate the 
hypotheses (see Table 6). Contrasts 1 and 2 tested the effects of the timing of an alibi schema 
on recall of the alibi story. Did knowledge that the story was an alibi bias evaluators' recall 
toward alibi-relevant information? When participants knew the story was an alibi prior to 
viewing the video (the alibi-only, before viewing video condition), they exhibited a 
significantly greater critical time period bias than participants who did not know the story 
was an alibi (the alibi-only, after primary measures condition) t(211) - 2.30, p < .05, d= 
0.28 (Contrast 1). However, when participants discovered the story was an alibi after viewing 
the video (the alibi-only, after viewing video condition), they did not exhibit a greater critical 
time period bias than participants who did not know the story was an alibi (the alibi-only, 
after primary measures condition) #(277) = 0.03, p > .05, d= 0.003 (Contrast 2). Thus, an 
alibi schema appears to influence encoding, but not retrieval, of alibi information. 
Did the knowledge that the alibi provider was guilty have the same effect when the 
information came before the alibi story as it did when it came after the alibi story? Contrast 3 
examined the interaction between the guilty alibi schema and alibi-only schema with the 
timing of the schema activation (before or after the alibi video), and this interaction was 
significant #(277) = 2.12,p < .05 d= 0.33. Because the interaction was significant, three 
additional contrasts were conducted to test the simple effects. In the before viewing video 
conditions, participants in the alibi-guilty condition did not exhibit greater critical time 
period bias compared to those in the alibi-only condition #(277) = 1.89,/? > .05, d-0.23 
(Contrast 4). Similarly, in the after viewing video conditions, participants in the alibi-guilty 
Table 6. Planned single-degree-of-freedom contrasts on critical time bias score 
Comparison 
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Alibi-only, Before video 1 .5 1 1 .5 1 
Alibi-guilty, Before video -.5 -1 
Alibi-innocent, Before video -.5 -1 
Alibi-only, After video 1 -.5 1 -1 -.5 1 
Alibi-guilty, After video .5 -1 
Alibi-innocent, After video .5 -1 
Alibi-only, After measures -1 -1 
Significant at/? < .05: * * * * * 
Value of contrast: 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.02 
SE: 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Cohen's d: 0.28 0.003 0.33 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.11 
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condition did not exhibit greater critical time period bias compared to those in the alibi-only 
condition #(277) = 1.96,/? > .05, d= 0.24 (Contrast 5). However, participants in the alibi-
only, before viewing video condition exhibited a significantly greater critical time period bias 
than those in the alibi-only, after viewing video condition #(277) = 2.32, p < .05, d-0.28 
(Contrast 6). This pattern of simple effects indicates that knowing that they were viewing an 
alibi before viewing the video increased biased recall if participants did not know that the 
alibi provider was guilty, but knowing the alibi provider was guilty nullified this effect. 
Did the knowledge that the alibi provider was innocent have the same effect when the 
information came before the alibi story as it did when it came after the alibi story? Contrast 7 
examined the interaction between the innocent alibi schema and the alibi-only schema with 
the timing of the alibi information, and this interaction was significant #(277) = 2.88, p < .05, 
d-0.35. Thus, simple effects contrasts were conducted. In the before viewing video 
conditions, participants in the alibi-only condition exhibited a significantly greater critical 
time period bias compared to those in the alibi-innocent condition #(277) = 3.19,/? < .05, d-
0.38 (Contrast 8), indicating that participants who knew before viewing the video that the 
alibi provider was truthful exhibited less of a critical time bias than participants who only 
knew the story was an alibi. In the after viewing video conditions, participants in the alibi-
only condition did not exhibit greater critical time period bias compared to those in the alibi-
innocent condition #(277) = 0.88,p > .05, d= 0.11 (Contrast 9). 
Multiple-Choice Memory Test. A subset of 154 participants were randomly assigned 
to answer 15 multiple-choice questions regarding what they remembered from the video 
story. Participants were given 1 point for each question they answered correctly on the test, 
and participants' score on the memory test was the sum of points earned (see Table 7 for 
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mean scores). Participants did not differ according to condition in how much overall 
information they correctly remembered F(6, 143) = 0.40, MSE = 2.86,/? > .05. Five of the 
multiple-choice questions concerned information from the critical time period, and 
participants did not differ according to condition in their scores for those five questions F(6, 
143) = 0.48, MSE = 0.85,/? > .05. Ten of the multiple-choice questions concerned 
information from the non-critical time periods, and participants did not differ according to 
condition in their scores for those ten questions F(6, 143) - 0.56, MSE = 1.47,/? > .05. 
Table 7. Mean scores on multiple-choice memory test 
Type of Alibi Information 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
12.9 (2.2) 
13.0(1.6) 
13.3 (1.8) 
12.9(1.7) 
12.6(1.5) 
13.0(1.3) 
13.2(1.5) 
12.9(1.8) 
13.0(1.5) 
Total 13.1 (1.9) 12.8(1.6) 13.1 (1.4) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
The Belief Measures. Although not intended as a primary measure for Experiment 2, 
participants answered the same set of belief measures as in Experiment 1 (see Table 8 for 
means and standard deviations). Because of the intuitive absurdity of informing evaluators of 
a suspect's guilt or innocence prior to asking evaluators how much they believe an alibi, the 
belief measures from the alibi-innocent and alibi-guilty conditions were not considered 
theoretically interesting and were thus not included in the analysis. More useful and 
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theoretically interesting were the three conditions in which participants were not told the 
ultimate status of the alibi provider. The time at which participants were told the story was an 
alibi did not affect participants' belief judgments F(2, 117) = 0.89, MSE = 5.11,/? > .05. 
Likewise, timing of the alibi schema did not affect participants' ratings of how believable a 
detective would find the alibi F(2, 117) = 1.54, MSE = 5.47,/? > .05. Lastly, the time at 
which participants were told the story was an alibi did not affect participants' judgments of 
the strength of the alibi F( 2, 117) = 1.20, MSE - 2.47, p > .05. 
Table 8. Belief measures as a function of timing and type of alibi information 
Belief 
Type of Alibi Information 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
6.05(2.17) 
6.19(2.38) 
6.70 (2.22) 
5.49 (2.55) 
4.70(1.93) 
6.34 (2.69) 
6.74(2.10) 
5.96 (2.47) 
5.88(2.14) 
Total 6.31 (2.26) 5.10(2.24) 6.54 (2.40) 
Detective Belief 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
4.85 (2.07) 
5.10(2.42) 
5.76 (2.52) 
4.59 (2.23) 
3 .63 (1.62) 
5.78 (2.60) 
6.19(2.34) 
5.07 (2.30) 
4.97 (2.13) 
Total 5.24 (2.34) 4.11(1.93) 5.99 (2.47) 
Alibi Strength Rating 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
3.95 (1.41) 
3.64 (1.69) 
4.19(1.60) 
3.64(1.55) 
3.12(1.52) 
4.20(1.44) 
4.10(1.54) 
3.93 (1.47) 
3.62 (1.58) 
Total 3.93 (1.57) 3.38(1.54) 4.15(1.49) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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The Trait Ratings. Although not intended as a primary measure for Experiment 2, 
participants also answered the trait rating questions from Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, 
traits were divided into the two categories, relevant traits and irrelevant traits, used by Olson 
and Wells (2004a). Positive traits {honest, open, sincere, trustworthy, loyal, intelligent, 
content, caring, curious, friendly, ambitious, funny) were reverse-coded so that all scores 
carried a negative connotation (i.e., trustworthy became untrustworthy, see Appendix F for 
correlations among individual trait ratings and belief measures). Traits were then averaged to 
yield composite scores for both relevant and irrelevant traits (see Table 9 for means and 
standard deviations). 
Table 9. Mean composite trait ratings as a function of timing and type of alibi information 
Relevant Traits 
Type of Alibi Information 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
4.22 (0.67) 
3.93 (0.75) 
4.02 (0.85) 
4.12(0.66) 
4.32 (0.76) 
3.79 (0.76) 
3.77 (0.75) 
4.04 (0.72) 
4.01 (0.79) 
Total 4.06 (0.76) 4.23 (0.72) 3.78 (0.75) 
Irrelevant Traits 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 
After viewing video 
After primary measures 
4.22 (0.68) 
4.45 (0.66) 
4.26 (0.73) 
4.29 (0.69) 
4.54 (0.65) 
3.98 (0.68) 
4.35 (0.62) 
4.16(0.69) 
4.45 (0.64) 
Total 4.31 (0.69) 4.42 (0.68) 4.17(0.67) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. All traits coded to have a negative 
connotation; higher composite scores mean a more negative evaluation. 
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Did the timing and type of alibi information make a difference in participants' 
relevant trait ratings of the alibi provider? An overall oneway ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect F(6, 278) = 3.32,MSE = 0.56, p < .05. Thus several contrasts were conducted to 
determine the nature of the differences. Did the type of alibi information affect participant's 
relevant trait ratings? A oneway ANOVA comparison showed a significant effect F(2, 282) = 
7.58, MSE= 0.56, p < .05. Individual contrasts revealed no significant difference in relevant 
trait ratings from participants with the guilty alibi schema (the alibi-guilty conditions) and 
participants with the nondirectional alibi schema (the alibi-only conditions) 7(282) = 1.58, SE 
= 0.11, p > .05. However, there was a significant difference in relevant trait ratings from 
participants with the innocent alibi schema (the alibi-innocent conditions) and participants 
with the non-directional alibi schema 7(282) = 2.60, SE = 0.1 \,p < .05; there was also a 
significant difference in ratings from participants with the guilty alibi schema and 
participants with the innocent alibi schema 7(282) = 3.84, SE = 0.12,p < .05. Participants 
with an alibi schema who did not know the ultimate guilt or innocence of the alibi provider 
thus provided relevant trait ratings more similar to those who knew the alibi provider was 
guilty rather than those who knew the alibi provider was innocent. Did the timing of alibi 
information affect participants' relevant trait ratings? A oneway ANOVA comparison 
showed that it did not F(2, 282) = 0.06, MSE = 0.59, p > .05. 
Did the timing and type of alibi information make a difference in participants' 
irrelevant trait ratings of the alibi provider? An overall oneway ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect F(6, 278) = 2.93, MSE = 0.49, p < .05. Thus several contrasts were 
conducted to determine the nature of the differences. Did the type of alibi information affect 
participant's irrelevant trait ratings? A oneway ANOVA comparison showed that it did not 
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F(2, 282) = 2.77, MSE = 0.47, p > .05. Did the timing of alibi information affect participants' 
irrelevant trait ratings? A oneway ANOVA comparison revealed a significant effect F{2, 
282) = 5.63,MSE = 0.46,p< .05. Individual contrasts revealed no significant difference in 
irrelevant trait ratings from participants who learned the story was an alibi before the video 
compared to participants who learned the story was an alibi after the primary measures 7(282) 
= 0.75, SE = 0.13,p > .05. Likewise, there was no significant difference in irrelevant trait 
ratings from participants who learned the story was an alibi after the video compared to 
participants who learned the story was an alibi after the primary measures 7(282) = 1.51, SE = 
0.13, p > .05. However, participants who learned the story was an alibi before the video rated 
the alibi provider significantly less negatively on the irrelevant traits than did participants 
who learned the story was an alibi after the video 7(282) = 3.33, SE = 0.09, p < .05. 
Discussion 
An active alibi schema could alter how people process a narrative account by causing 
them to engage in increased processing of information most relevant to an alibi at the 
expense of processing less relevant details. Thus, the recall of a narrative account by 
someone who had an active alibi schema would be more heavily concentrated on the time 
markers in the story and the information contained within the critical (i.e., alibi-relevant) 
time period compared to someone without an active alibi schema. This effect could arise one 
of three ways: through selective encoding, selective retrieval, or both. 
There was no evidence of a reliable bias in processing at the level of retrieval. By 
comparing the alibi-only, after viewing video condition with the alibi-only, after primary 
measures condition, I could assess the affects of an alibi schema on retrieval of the alibi 
story. Participants who discovered after the video that they had seen an alibi had 42% of their 
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overall recall come from the critical time period, which was not different from the amount of 
information from the critical time period recalled by participants who completed the recall 
measure without knowing that the story was an alibi. Also, the alibi-guilty, after viewing 
video condition (at 46%) and the alibi-innocent, after viewing video condition (at 44%) were 
not different from the alibi-only, after video condition (at 42%), indicating that a directional 
alibi schema does not bias retrieval. 
There was, however, evidence of a bias in processing toward alibi-relevant 
information at the level of encoding. The difference between the alibi-only, before viewing 
video condition and the alibi-only, after viewing video condition is the effect of the alibi 
schema on encoding of the information from the video. Participants who knew before 
watching the video that they were watching an alibi had a greater proportion of their total 
recall come from the critical time period (47%) than did participants who did not know they 
saw an alibi until after the video (42%). Consider that critical-time-bias score from the alibi-
only, after primary measures condition represents the base-rate score, as participants in this 
condition viewed the video and answered the primary measures under the impression that the 
story was simply a narrative account. Participants who knew prior to the video that they were 
seeing an alibi also had a greater critical time bias than the base rate (47% to 42%, 
respectively). Interestingly, knowledge that the alibi provider was innocent prior to viewing 
the video nullified the tendency to bias recall toward the critical time period (40% compared 
to 47% in the alibi-only condition). 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that alibis elicit different processing from a 
recipient of a story than do everyday memory statements. One way alibis differ from 
everyday memory statements is that alibis must solve a time/space problem: The alibi must 
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'prove' that at the time of the crime, the alibi provider was somewhere else from the scene of 
the crime (Olson, 2002). An alibi evaluator will likely be tuned to information relating to the 
time/space problem and focus his or her attention and processing resources to that 
information. The current research suggests that this additional processing of alibi-relevant, 
time/space information is largely the result of processing at encoding (be it selective 
encoding or simply increased processing). 
Although retrieval effects did not achieve statistical significance in the current study, 
it is possible that a critical-time bias might surface during retrieval under different 
circumstances. One possibility is simply that the effect of an alibi schema on selective 
retrieval is weaker than the effect of an alibi schema on encoding, and that with sufficient 
power, a retrieval effect would become evident. However, a more compelling argument for 
why retrieval effects may not have surfaced in the current experiment is due to the peculiar 
nature of an alibi compared to the everyday memory statement. For an everyday memory 
statement, the kinds of stories that people often share, details about time and location are less 
important than for an alibi statement. When a receiver does not know that the story is an 
alibi, he or she does not know what times are relevant to the alibi, and perhaps does not 
encode any time markers. Then, when the receiver discovers the story had been an alibi, the 
receiver does not have the time markers necessary to direct retrieval to the relevant time 
frame. Thus, no matter how motivated an evaluator might be at that point to selectively recall 
only information from the critical time period, the evaluator would be unable to do so. 
In the current experiment, the finding of a critical time bias (a recall bias toward 
alibi-relevant information) is especially interesting because the alibi-relevant information in 
this particular operationalization of an alibi appeared during the middle part of the 
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videotaped story and thus had to overcome both the primacy and recency effects to be 
represented to a greater degree in recall (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971). 
While not primary measures in Experiment 2, the belief measures and trait ratings 
provide interesting fodder for consideration. Participants' belief in the alibi provider's story 
did not change as a function of the amount of time the participants operated under the belief 
that the story was an alibi. Interestingly, relevant trait ratings from participants who did not 
know the ultimate status of the alibi provider (M= 4.06) were more similar to the relevant 
trait ratings from participants who believed the alibi provider was guilty (M= 4.23) than the 
ratings from participants who believed the alibi provider was innocent (M= 3.78). This 
suggests some evidence in support of the alibi skepticism hypothesis—an evaluator uncertain 
of the truth status of the alibi provider might interpret nonverbal cues from the alibi provider 
as indicative of deceit. This is particularly likely with police detectives, who might have a 
base-rate expectation that a given alibi provider will be lying to them (Eckman, 2001). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
One of the original purposes of this research was an empirical test of the alibi 
skepticism hypothesis: that people are skeptical and disbelieving when evaluating alibi 
information compared to other types of information. Unfortunately the findings of the two 
studies in this dissertation do not present overwhelming evidence in support of the alibi 
skepticism hypothesis. 
Experiment 1 replicated Olson and Wells (2004a) insofar as it presented two alibis 
with different levels of evidence as supporting proof, and the strong alibi was considered 
more believable and was rated as stronger than the weak alibi. However, Experiment 1 was 
unable to speak to the starting point from which alibi evaluators begin. An underlying 
assumption of much of the alibi work to date is that evaluation of an alibi requires close 
scrutiny of the alibi information (Burke & Turtle, 2003; Culhane & Hosch, in press; Olson & 
Wells, 2004a). It was critical that the cognitive busyness manipulation interrupt the central, 
controlled processing of the alibi information so that the starting point from which evaluators 
begin might influence the belief ratings of the evaluators. Unfortunately, the cognitive 
busyness manipulation did not significantly affect participants' belief ratings, which were the 
primary measures of the experiment. Previous research has shown that when there is an a-
priori bias to believe or disbelieve, cognitive busyness manipulations can successfully reveal 
the starting point or bias (Gilbert et al., 1993; Skurnik et al., 2003). The failure of the 
busyness manipulation to interact with alibi strength is not consistent with the alibi 
skepticism hypothesis—that people begin with a propensity to disbelieve the alibi. But, as 
discussed earlier, it is also not consistent with the hypothesis that people begin with a 
propensity to believe. Nor are the data consistent with the hypothesis that people begin with a 
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neutral starting point. All three hypotheses predict an interaction between cognitive busyness 
and alibi strength. A fourth possibility is that some people begin with a starting point of 
disbelief (perhaps those who are naturally skeptics) while other people begin with a starting 
point of belief (the naturally trusting). Through random assignment, these two 
subpopulations are likely to be represented equally in all groups, in which case they would 
counteract each other, leading to a prediction of an interaction similar to that of a neutral 
starting point. Thus, the data are not consistent with the possibility of differing starting 
points, either. 
While it is possible that the cognitive busyness manipulation did not tax participants 
adequately, a possibility previously unforeseen in this work is that central processing is not 
required for evaluation of an alibi to take place—that peripheral, shallow processing can 
produce similar judgments of belief and alibi strength as more central, deep processing. This 
superficial evaluation hypothesis seems consistent with a pattern of results that emerged in 
the irrelevant trait ratings. Irrelevant trait ratings and participants' belief were more highly 
correlated in the cognitively-busy conditions than in the non-cognitively-busy conditions, 
suggesting a more pronounced halo effect in the ratings of the alibi provider from 
cognitively-busy participants. This is precisely the kind of effect one might expect if 
participants are basing their judgments regarding the believability of the alibi on a general 
impression formed from simple, peripheral cues, i.e. engaging in superficial evaluation of the 
alibi. 
I intend to continue investigation into the superficial-evaluation hypothesis to 
determine the extent to which alibi evaluators use peripheral cues in their evaluation process. 
For example, would evaluators reach similar judgments as participants in the current study if 
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they were unable to view the video, and only had aural peripheral cues to rely upon? Would 
evaluators make similar judgments if they were unable to hear the alibi provider, and only 
had visual peripheral cues to rely upon? One way to prevent peripheral cues from influencing 
judgments would be to create video of an alibi provider giving an alibi and manually edit the 
video to include the information from the detective about the evidence supporting the alibi. 
In these new videos, the alibi provider would be reacting to the information from the 
detective in the same way for both a strong and a weak alibi, leaving the evaluator unable to 
determine the strength of the alibi from nonverbal peripheral cues from the alibi provider. 
Would cognitively-busy evaluators still produce similar judgments as non-cognitively busy 
evaluators? If the superficial-evaluation hypothesis is valid, cognitively-busy participants 
should not produce judgments similar to non-cognitively-busy participants when viewing 
videos that control nonverbal peripheral cues, and the starting point from which they begin 
their judgment should surface in their judgment. 
Experiment 2 was designed to address the nature of evaluators' processing of alibis 
compared to processing other narrative accounts. As expected, when participants knew ahead 
of time that they were watching an alibi, their recall was biased toward the critical time 
period in which the crime occurred—a greater proportion of their total recalled information 
was information from the time period relevant to the alibi. However, when participants 
learned after viewing that they had watched an alibi, this recall bias did not occur. This 
suggests that processing differences arise during encoding, not at the time of retrieval. Also, 
knowledge that the alibi provider was innocent or guilty reduced the critical time period bias; 
perhaps participants who knew the ultimate status of the alibi provider felt less compelled to 
focus on critical time details because the case was 'solved.' Knowledge that the alibi 
55 
provider was innocent prior to viewing the video eliminated the critical time period bias, 
indicating that these participants treated the innocent person's alibi as if it were simply an 
autobiographical story and information from the critical time period appeared in their recall 
in the same proportion it appeared in the video. 
Despite alternative explanations for the failure of the busyness manipulation in 
Experiment 1 to reveal a skepticism bias, serious consideration must be given to the 
possibility that the alibi skepticism hypothesis is incorrect. Perhaps the evaluator skepticism 
that surfaced in Olson and Wells (2004a) arose in part because of the barrenness and purely 
verbal nature of the manipulation—participants were given short paragraphs describing each 
alibi. People may tend to be less skeptical in the face of an alibi provider (like the videotaped 
alibi in the current study), similar to how people in deception experiments tend to judge 
people as generally truthful (O'Sullivan, 2003). Also, in the Olson and Wells study, 
participants were asked to take on the role of a detective, which may have served to make 
them more skeptical than they otherwise would have been. Note that in both the current 
experiments, participants' ratings of a hypothetical detective's belief in the alibis were 
always lower than their ratings of their own belief in the alibis. Although Experiment 2 was 
not designed specifically to examine the alibi skepticism hypothesis, aspects of the belief and 
trait data could be interpreted as being inconsistent with the skepticism hypothesis. 
Specifically, the belief ratings in the alibi-only conditions (M= 6.31, when participants did 
not know the ultimate status of the alibi provider) are much more similar to the alibi-innocent 
conditions (M= 6.54) than they are to the alibi-guilty conditions (M= 5.10). The alibi-only 
conditions were not significantly different from the alibi-innocent conditions 7(282) = 0.74, p 
> .05, d= 0.09, but both the alibi-only and alibi-innocent conditions were significantly 
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different from the alibi-guilty conditions /s(282) = 4.09 and 3.72,ps < .05, ds = 0.49 and 
0.44, respectively. On the other hand, the ratings of the alibi provider on traits relevant to an 
alibi (e.g., trustworthiness, sincerity, honesty) were consistent with the skepticism 
hypothesis: Participants who did not know the ultimate status of the alibi provider rated him 
similarly to those who knew he was guilty: more negatively than the ratings from participants 
who knew the alibi provider was innocent. However, these trait data are rather weak support 
for the skepticism hypothesis—if the alibi skepticism hypothesis was valid, evidence for it 
should have surfaced in the belief data. The trait ratings are more indirect and not as closely 
related to the skepticism idea as belief. On balance, the data are more consistent with the idea 
that evaluators approach alibis with belief rather than with skepticism; perhaps Spinoza was 
right after all. 
That evaluators would be skeptical of an alibi story is an intuitively satisfying 
hypothesis. However, data from the current studies suggests that the alibi skepticism 
hypothesis may not be as robust as first proposed by this dissertation and Olson and Wells 
(2004a). Perhaps evaluators assume Grice's (1975) maxim of quality—that people are 
generally speaking truth—even when evaluating an alibi. Perhaps people want to believe the 
best about others. The skepticism hypothesis may be more evident in particular 
populations—people who have a high internal base-rate of deceptive behavior (natural 
skeptics) or police detectives, who may have considerable experience with fabricated alibis. 
While the alibi skepticism hypothesis did not receive a great deal of support, the 
current research did provide some evidence that evaluators process alibis in a different 
fashion than they would process everyday memory statements. More research into the 
differences between alibis and everyday memory statements will clarify the nature of the 
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alibi schema and the processing it elicits. Lastly, the current research provides rich fodder for 
future study in the superficial-evaluation hypothesis—does evaluation require consideration 
for the central facts of a case, or can evaluators reach similar decisions using simple 
peripheral cues? 
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APPENDIX A 
Weak Alibi Script 
Investigator: So where were you, and what were you doing, between noon and one last 
Saturday? 
Alibi Provider: Well, let's see... last Saturday, oh yeah, that was a hell of a day... I was 
planning on getting up to get some stuff done at the library, but my alarm clock didn't 
go off, and I woke up late, like 11:00. So I had some cheesy 80s movie on the TV 
(maybe Howard the Duck?) as I raced around trying to get my stuff together.. I 
couldn't find anything, my watch was gone, my roommate nowhere to be found, my 
books were all over the floor, the keys were somewhere in the couch, you know how 
mornings like those go. I was scarfing down breakfast when my sister called and of 
course I had to find the cell phone... so she called about twenty after 11 and wanted 
me to come fix her car. Well, my sister lives all the way across town, so I was like, 
sure, I'll come check out your car, but I can't guarantee anything. 
So I get to my sister's at quarter to noon and her car isn't messed up—it just 
needs some new belts and a battery. Trust my sis to be clueless. 
Investigator: Yes, well, I talked to your sister, and she said she's pretty sure she called you 
for help on Saturday. 
Alibi Provider: Well, I was there! Anyway, she's on her way out the door to work, and she 
got her boyfriend to drive her; he was just sitting in his car and honking the horn. So 
she leaves me the keys to the apartment and her car and tells me to fix it before she 
gets back home. She was all, "I'll pay you on Monday when I get paid" and I still 
haven't seen any of what she owes me. Anyway, I went over to NAPA to get the stuff 
I'd need for sis's car. 
Investigator: The clerk at NAPA remembers somebody coming in to get belts and a battery, 
but he didn't recognize your picture... 
Alibi Provider: I thought my friend Jeff was working that day, so I wandered all over the 
store looking for him. He usually works on Saturdays, but he must have been out to 
lunch or something, cuz I didn't see him there. I got the stuff I needed—I noticed as I 
grabbed my wallet my card was expired so I had to use most of my cash to pay for it 
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all. I stopped at Arby's on the way back to my sister's, cuz it was like 12:30 and I was 
hungry. And then there was this huge line and they gave me a plain roast beef when 
what I really ordered was a cheddar melt but I didn't discover that until I got back to 
my sister's. 
I got the car fixed and finally headed to campus by 1:00. My sister has this 
little fake rock in the garden to leave the spare set of keys in; naturally I remembered 
about that when I was halfway down the block, so I had to cut a U-turn and put her 
keys away. Then I drove to campus. Of course the lot was full and I had to drive 
around to like 3 different lots before I found one I could park in. Just as I was 
gathering my stuff from my car I thought I remembered I had group meeting in the 
computer lab, so I ran for it. But then when I got there nobody was there, so I dug out 
my notebook and discovered the group meeting was the next day, Sunday, so I really 
wasn't missing anything! That was a real relief. So I hung out in the lab and surfed 
the web to check out flights for spring break. Two of my friends are headed to 
Mexico, so I wanted to see how much money that would cost me to join them. I was 
at the lab until probably 2:30, when my friend Ryan called my cell and told me that 
he was standing by my car and it had a ticket on it—I guess I forgot to pay the meter. 
Again. 
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APPENDIX B 
Strong Alibi Script 
Investigator: So where were you, and what were you doing, between noon and one last 
Saturday? 
Alibi Provider: Well, let's see.. .last Saturday, oh yeah, that was a hell of a day. ..I was 
planning on getting up to get some stuff done at the library, but my alarm clock didn't 
go off, and I woke up late, like 11:00. So I had some cheesy 80s movie on the TV 
(maybe Howard the Duck!) as I raced around trying to get my stuff together. ..I 
couldn't find anything, my watch was gone, my roommate nowhere to be found, my 
books were all over the floor, the keys were somewhere in the couch, you know how 
mornings like those go. I was scarfing down breakfast when my sister called and of 
course I had to find the cell phone... so she called about twenty after 11 and wanted 
me to come fix her car. Well, my sister lives all the way across town, so I was like, 
sure, I'll come check out your car, but I can't guarantee anything. 
So I get to my sister's at quarter to noon and her car isn't messed up—it just 
needs some new belts and a battery. Trust my sis to be clueless. 
Investigator: Yes, well, I talked to your sister, and she was quite certain you fixed her car 
that Saturday. 
Alibi Provider: Well, I was there! Anyway, she's on her way out the door to work, and she 
got her boyfriend to drive her; he was just sitting in his car and honking the horn. So 
she leaves me the keys to the apartment and her car and tells me to fix it before she 
gets back home. She was all, "I'll pay you on Monday when I get paid" and I still 
haven't seen any of what she owes me. Anyway, I went over to NAPA to get the stuff 
I'd need for sis's car, and I thought my friend Jeff was working that day, so I 
wandered all over the store looking for him. He usually works on Saturdays, but he 
must have been out to lunch or something, cuz I didn't see him there. I got the stuff I 
needed—I used my credit card so I'd have a record for my sister. 
Investigator: Yes, I have here a copy of your credit card statement, and I see your purchase is 
on here... 
Alibi Provider: I stopped at Arby's on the way back to my sister's, cuz it was like 12:30 and I 
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was hungry. And then there was this huge line and they gave me a plain roast beef 
when what I really ordered was a cheddar melt but I didn't discover that until I got 
back to my sister's. 
I got the car fixed and finally headed to campus by 1:00. My sister has this 
little fake rock in the garden to leave the spare set of keys in; naturally I remembered 
about that when I was halfway down the block, so I had to cut a U-turn and put her 
keys away. Then I drove to campus. Of course the lot was full and I had to drive 
around to like 3 different lots before I found one I could park in. Just as I was 
gathering my stuff from my car I thought I remembered I had group meeting in the 
computer lab, so I ran for it. But then when I got there nobody was there, so I dug out 
my notebook and discovered the group meeting was the next day, Sunday, so I really 
wasn't missing anything! That was a real relief. So I hung out in the lab and surfed 
the web to check out flights for spring break. Two of my friends are headed to 
Mexico, so I wanted to see how much money that would cost me to join them. I was 
at the lab until probably 2:30, when my friend Ryan called my cell and told me that 
he was standing by my car and it had a ticket on it—I guess I forgot to pay the meter. 
Again. 
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APPENDIX C 
Alibi Script—Experiment 2 
Investigator: So where were you, and what were you doing, between noon and one last 
Saturday? 
Alibi Provider: Well, let's see.. .last Saturday, oh yeah, that was a hell of a day/. I was 
planning on getting up to get some stuff done at the library,/ but my alarm clock 
didn't go off,/ and I woke up late, like 11:00V So I had some cheesy 80s movie on the 
TV (maybe Howard the Duck?)! as I raced around trying to get my stuff together/.. I 
couldn't find anything,/ my watch was gone,/ my roommate nowhere to be found,/ 
my books were all over the floor,/ the keys were somewhere in the couch,/ you know 
how mornings like those go./1 was scarfing down breakfast/ when my sister called/ 
and of course I had to find the cell phone/... so she called about twenty after 11/ and 
wanted me to come fix her car./ Well, my sister lives all the way across town,/ so I 
was like, sure, I'll come check out your car,/ but I can't guarantee anything./ [End 1st 
time block] 
So I get to my sister's at quarter to noon/ and her car isn't messed up/—it just 
needs some new belts and a battery./ Trust my sis to be clueless./ Anyway, she's on 
her way out the door to work,/ and she got her boyfriend to drive her;/ he was just 
sitting in his car and honking the horn./ So she leaves me the keys to the apartment 
and her car/ and tells me to fix it before she gets back home./ She was all, "I'll pay 
you on Monday when I get paid"/ and I still haven't seen any of what she owes me./ 
Anyway, I went over to NAPA to get the stuff I'd need for sis's car./1 thought my 
friend Jeff was working that day,/ so I wandered all over the store looking for him./ 
He usually works on Saturdays,/ but he must have been out to lunch or something,/ 
cuz I didn't see him there./1 got the stuff I needed/—I noticed as I grabbed my wallet 
my card was expired/ so I had to use most of my cash to pay for it all./1 stopped at 
Arby's on the way back to my sister's,/ cuz it was like 12:30/ and I was hungry./ And 
then there was this huge line/ and they gave me a plain roast beef when what I really 
ordered was a cheddar melt/ but I didn't discover that until I got back to my sister's./ 
I got the car fixed/ and finally headed to campus by 1:00V [End 2nd time 
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block] My sister has this little fake rock in the garden to leave the spare set of keys 
in;/ naturally I remembered about that when I was halfway down the block,/ so I had 
to cut a U-turn and put her keys away/. Then I drove to campus./ Of course the lot 
was full/ and I had to drive around to like 3 different lots before I found one I could 
park in./ Just as I was gathering my stuff from my car/1 thought I remembered I had 
group meeting in the computer lab,/ so I ran for it./ But then when I got there nobody 
was there,/ so I dug out my notebook/ and discovered the group meeting was the next 
day, Sunday,/ so I really wasn't missing anything!/ That was a real relief./ So I hung 
out in the lab/ and surfed the web to check out flights for spring break./ Two of my 
friends are headed to Mexico,/ so I wanted to see how much money that would cost 
me to join them./1 was at the lab until probably 2:30,/ when my friend Ryan called 
my cell/ and told me that he was standing by my car/ and it had a ticket on it/—I 
guess I forgot to pay the meter. Again./ [End 3rd time block] 
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APPENDIX D 
Memory Measures, Experiment 2 (Correct Answers in Bold) 
1. The man in the video said he was 
planning to get up and get things done at: 
A. the library 
B. the bank 
C. the laundromat 
2. Where did the man say his sister lived? 
A. across town 
B. next door 
C. another city 
3. He said his keys were: 
A. nowhere to be found 
B. in his car 
C. somewhere in the couch 
4. His sister called to ask him: 
A. to give her a ride to work 
B. to fix her car 
C. to lend her money 
5. He arrived at his sister's place at 
approximately: 
A. 10:00 AM 
B. 10:45 AM 
C. 11:15 AM 
D. 11:45 AM 
6. Why did the man say he went to NAPA? 
A. to get parts for his sister's 
car 
B. to visit a friend 
C. to pick up a check 
7. The man said he wandered all over the 
store looking for someone. Who was it? 
A. his friend Ryan 
B. a store clerk 
C. his friend Jeff 
D. his sister's boyfriend 
8. Why did he pay cash at NAPA? 
A. because he forgot his 
checkbook 
B. because his credit card was 
expired 
C. because his sister had given 
him cash 
9. What time did the man say he stopped at 
Arby's? 
A. 11:30 
B. 12:30 
C. 1:30 
10. What time did he go to campus? 
A. 12:30 
B. 1:00 
C. 2:00 
11. Why did he have to go back to his sister's 
place? 
A. he forgot to turn the oven off 
B. he forgot to leave his sister's 
keys 
C. he forgot his bookbag 
12. Why was there no one at the computer lab 
meeting he went to? 
A. because the meeting was earlier 
in the day 
B. because the meeting was 
cancelled 
C. because the meeting was the 
next day 
13. What did he do in the computer lab when 
he discovered that there was no group 
meeting? 
A. he checked internet airline 
fares 
B. he chatted with a friend 
C. he printed a report for class 
14. How late was he in the computer lab? 
A. 1:30 
B. 2:00 
C. 2:30 
15. What was on his car when his friend 
called? 
A. his friend 
B. an advertisement 
C. a parking ticket 
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APPENDIX E 
Recall Scores as a Function of Timing and Type of Alibi Information 
Mean Overall Recall 
Type of Alibi Information 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 48.6(18.0) 48.3 (16.7) 48.9(15.4) 48.6(16.6) 
After viewing video 46.7 (19.4) 46.6(18.5) 53.2(15.2) 48.8(17.9) 
After primary measures 46.5 (17.7) 
Total 47.3 (18.4) 47.4 (17.6) 51.05(15.3) 
Mean Frequency of Perfect Recall 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 17.9(8.8) 17.5 (8.0) 18.2(7.1) 17.9(7.9) 
After viewing video 17.6 (9.3) 17.2(8.1) 19.9 (7.8) 18.2 (8.4) 
After primary measures 17.4 (7.9) 
Total 17.6 (8.7) 17.3 (8.0) 19.0(7.5) 
Mean Frequency of Gist Recall 
Timing of Information Alibi Alibi/Guilty Alibi/Innocent Total 
Before viewing video 12.8 (4.4) 13.1(4.9) 12.5 (4.9) 12.8 (4.7) 
After viewing video 11.5(3.9) 12.2 (4.8) 13.4 (4.2) 12.4 (4.4) 
After primary measures 11.9(4.2) 
Total 12.1 (4.2) 12.6 (4.9) 13.0(4.5) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX F 
Correlations Among Belief Measures and Individual Trait Ratings, Experiment 2 
Main Measures 
Belief Detective Belief Alibi Strength 
Relevant Traits 
Conniving -0.13* -0.14* -0.06 
Calculating 0.03 0.05 0.10 
Deceitful -0.27* -0.28* -0.22* 
Suspicious -0.32* -0.34* -0.29* 
Cunning -0.14* -0.14* -0.07 
Scheming -0.27* -0.27* -0.20* 
Honest 0.65* 0.63* 0.57* 
Open 0.41* 0.39* 0.43* 
Sincere 0.53* 0.52* 0.48* 
Trustworthy 0.37* 0.44* 0.37* 
Loyal 0.43* 0.45* 0.35* 
Intelligent 0.43* 0.46* 0.46* 
Irrelevant Traits 
Shrewd -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 
Shy 0.04 0.12* 0.13* 
Content 0.22* 0.26* 0.26* 
Caring 0.24* 0.25* 0.25* 
Curious 0.19* 0.16* 0.20* 
Friendly 0.18* 0.17* 0.17* 
Ambitious 0.10 0.14* 0.13* 
Funny 0.14* 0.17* 0.19* 
Note: Correlations marked with * are significant atp< .05. 
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